Introduction
Women are widely under-represented in top-level social positions. While several potential reasons may explain this fact (Goldin and Rouse, 2000, Altonji and Blank, 1999) , recent findings have emphasised one specific cause as particularly relevant: women are less likely to self-select into competitions (Gupta et al., 2005 , Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007 , Niederle et al., 2008 . Dargnies (2009) shows that many men stay out of competition when it is team-based so that there is no gender gap in team tournament entry. This result is mainly due to high-performing men being repelled by the idea of helping a probably less able participant increase her payoffs. Indeed, high-performing men are willing to enter the team tournament, but only provided that they will be matched with a teammate of level close to their own. While high-performing men have an obvious interest in being matched with another highly efficient teammate, this may also suggest that they gain utility from performing with a teammate they share characteristics with. In other words, being in the same team sometimes means something more than a change in expected payoffs. If such is the case, performing at a similar level may act as an implicit common identity. It is then interesting to study whether an explicit, artificially-created, group identity would have similar effects. Indeed, a lot of competitions oppose groups of individuals who share some attributes whether it is a sport games opposing two nations or two firms competing for clients.
The aim of this paper is to study how the creation of a group identity affects men and women's willingness to enter competitive environments.
The impact of group identity on economic behaviors has lately become of keen interest to economists. Standard economic theory assumes economic agents act as isolated individuals.
However, individuals often perceive themselves as member of social groups and this may well have an impact on the decisions they have to make. If such is the case, understanding how group identity affects economic decisions would be crucial 1 . Akerlof and Kranton emphasize how social identity may affect economic outcomes (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000 . Following their work, experimental economists have been interested in studying how social identity changes individual behavior. Converging results indicate that individuals take more socially-oriented decisions when they deal with fellow group members rather than with random participants or outgroup members. For instance, Chen and Li (2009) finds that participants behave more altruistically with an ingroup match than with an outgroup. Charness et al. (2007) show that when group membership is made salient, either by common payoffs or by letting an audience of group members watch the decision-maker, decisions tend to favor more the payoffs of the whole group. Eckel and Grossman (2005) also find that a strong enough social identity increases cooperation significantly among the group. Given these results, one should expect social identity to influence decisions to compete, especially as part of a team. In an investment experiment, Sutter (2009) finds that the decisions made individually by one group member are very similar to the decisions taken jointly by all the members of a team.
The experimental design of the present paper is based on that of Dargnies (2009) and compares the competitive behavior of subjects who have been through preliminary "group identity-building" activities (Identity sessions) to that of subjects who have not (Benchmark sessions). I chose to artificially create a group identity in the lab so as to be able to control for whatever subjects bring into the lab. When entering the room, participants from the Identity sessions were randomly assigned to one of two groups and could communicate within their group through an instant message system in order to choose a name for their group.
They then had to perform a collective task during which they could also use the instant message system to communicate with the members of their group. After this first "group identity creation" phase was over, participants were not able to communicate. The second phase of the Identity sessions corresponds to the experimental design of Dargnies (2009) :
Participants had to go through several tasks for which their payoffs depended on how many additions they could solve in a given period of time. At some points, they were asked to make choices between two available remuneration schemes, one individual -a piece rate-and one that is team-based. In the Identity sessions, one's teammate belonged to her group and one's opponents belonged to the other group, while, in the Benchmark sessions, one's teammate and opponents were just participants present in the room. The choices made during the second phase of the Identity sessions were compared to those made during the Benchmark sessions for which there was no previous attempt to build a group identity.
If one of the reasons why high-performing men engage in team competition only with a teammate of the same level is because they need to share a common characteristic with their teammate, one would expect high-performing men to enter team competition at higher rates when their teammate is a fellow group member. Since team competition makes women a little more likely to enter the tournament, one could expect group identity to further increase women's willingness to enter the team tournament.
The main result is that, while high performing men from the Identity sessions were not willing to enter the team competition unless they were matched with a teammate of the same level, it was not the case in the Identity sessions where men did not opt out from the team competition when their teammate was a fellow group member. Indeed, high-performing men are less reluctant to be matched with a possibly less able participant when he or she belongs to his group. It then seems that high-performing men are not likely to enter a team competition unless they know their teammate will either be of level close to their own or share a social identity with them. I also found that, somehow surprisingly, women, and more precisely low-performing women, are less willing to enter competitive environments when being a member of a group and that they are less afraid of dragging down a possibly more efficient teammate when he or she belongs to her group than when he or she is a random participant. Two additional sessions were run using gender to form groups. Results imply that male vs female competition does not change much competitive behaviors in comparison with what happens in the Benchmark sessions where one does not know the gender of her opponent(s) and teammate. In particular, men are not more likely to help out their probably less able teammate when he is another man than when his or her gender is unknown.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is presented in section 2. Section 3 provides the results and section 4 discusses them. Finally, section 5
concludes.
Experimental Design
This paper compares the competitive behavior of subjects who have been through groupidentity-building activities (Identity sessions) to that of subjects who have not (Benchmark sessions). In the Identity sessions, participants were randomly separated in two groups and had to participate in activities meant to create a group identity before going through 8 tasks. In the Benchmark sessions, participants directly went through the 8 tasks without previously experiencing the creation of a group identity. During those 8 tasks, subjects had to participate to one tournament and had several opportunities to choose to enter tournaments.
In the Identity sessions, one's opponent(s) in the tournaments one engaged in were members of the other group and her teammate, if she had any, belonged to the same group as her own.
On the other hand, in the Benchmark sessions, one's tournament opponent(s) and teammate
were just participants present in the room.
Identity sessions

Creation of a Group Identity
Subjects entered the experimental laboratory and each sat in front of a computer. They were randomly assigned to one of two groups by the computer but did not know who was and was not part of their group.
Choice of a Group Name: Participants were told that they had two minutes to communicate through a chat program on their computers with the other group members to find a name to their group. Two chat programs were set so that communication was possible within the members of each group but participants of different groups could not communicate. After the two minutes were up, each participant had to enter his or her choice of group name.
If all members of a group did not agree on a name, the name that most members chose was considered to be the group name. The names of both group were publicly announced by the experimenter so as to further help trigger a sense of group membership.
Quizz: Participants had to answer to a four questions quizz. Since participants did ot know each other previous to the experimental session, it seemed necessary to add a group activity to the choice of a group name. For each question, four possible answers were available and participants had two minutes to discuss what they thought was the correct answer within their own group. At the end of the two minutes, each participant had to enter his or her answer knowing that the answer validated for the whole group would be the one chosen by a majority of members. Each member could earn 1 euro if the answer validated for his or her group was correct. Participants did not learn the correct answer and the answers chosen by the other members of their group until the end of the experiment.
The Tasks
This part of the experimental design builds on that of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) , henceforth NV. The exercise subjects were asked to perform is the same as in NV: additions of five 2-digit numbers.
Participants were told that they had to complete eight tasks of which two would be randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experiment. At the end of each task, participants were informed of their absolute performance (the number of additions they correctly solved) but were not informed of their relative performance until the end of the experiment. In a standard task, participants had to choose between a piece rate and a remuneration scheme involving competition (a tournament) before having three minutes to solve as many additions as they could. The compensation schemes available changed between tasks and participants were informed of their nature only immediately before performing the task. Each time a tournament was available, participants were informed that their opponents would be members of the other group while their teammate, in the case of team competition, would be a member of their own group. I made the participants from the Identity sessions go through the 8 same tasks as the participants from the Benchmark sessions so as to be able to properly compare the behaviors of participants from both kinds of sessions. This section details the tasks participants had to go through.
Task 1. Piece Rate: Participants are given the three-minute addition exercise. If Task 1 is randomly chosen for payment, they receive 50 cents per correct answer.
Task 2. Individual Tournament: Participants are given the three-minute addition exercise. If Task 2 is chosen for payment, the subject receives 1 euro per correct answer if she solved more additions than her opponent randomly chosen among the other group, otherwise she receives nothing. 
Belief-assessment Questions
A difference in confidence between men and women may explain a significant part of the gender gap in tournament entry. NV and NSV found that both men and women are overconfident but men are more so. In order to control for differences in confidence both in one's chances of winning the Individual Tournament and in one's team chances of winning the Team Tournament, participants had to answer belief-assessment questions at the end of the experiment. Participants had to guess the mean Task 2 performance of members of their own group and of the other group.
The participants were recalled that during Task 4 they had to choose between a Piece
Rate and a Team Tournament, for which two opponents were randomly drawn from among the members of the other group and a teammate was randomly drawn from among the members of the participant's group who had chosen the Team Tournament. They were also told that even if they had chosen the Piece Rate at Task 4, two opponents and one teammate had still been randomly chosen in the exact same way. Their own Task 2 performance was recalled to them and participants had to guess the Task 2 performances of their teammate and opponents chosen during Task 4.
A participant knew she would earn 1 euro per correct guess.
Benchmark sessions
The experimental design in the Benchmark sessions was the same as that of Identity sessions, except that participants did not go through the creation of a group Identity but started with the tasks. Also, in each tournament the participant had or wanted to participate in, her opponent(s) were randomly chosen among all the other participants present in the room and, in the case of the team tournament (TT) and team tournament with a teammate of the same level (TTid), her teammate was one of the other participant present in the room who also chose to enter the same team tournament.
Results
The experiment was run at the Parisian Experimental Economics Laboratory (LEEP) of Paris 1 University. In this section, after describing the unfolding of the group identity building activities, I
investigate how group identity affects performance and the decision to enter the individual tournament. I then study the effect of group identity on team tournament entry. Finally, the different impact of group identity for men and women is analyzed.
Group identity building activities
In the Identity sessions, the first thing subjects had to do was use the instant message system to find a group name with their fellow group numbers. The name chosen for each of the two groups in each of the 5 sessions were 4 : Groupex (for experimental group), FunBossTeam, Cosmos, Icare (Icarus), Jackson, Bogoss (phonetic for "beaux gosses" which approximately means hot guys), Cobaye (Guinea Pig), Groupe 1 (Group 1), Happy Face and Cosmopolites.
Depending on the sessions and the groups, the group members were more or less fast in reaching a consensus. In order to take these differences into account, in the following of the paper, session dummies were added in the regressions concerning the participants to the Identity sessions. Nevertheless, the coefficients of these sessions dummies were never found to be significant, suggesting that the response to group identity does not depend heavily on the session one belonged to.
3.2 The effect of social identity on performance, confidence and entry in the individual tournament
In this subsection, the changes in performance, confidence and decision to enter the individual tournament between subjects who have not experienced the creation of a group Identity and those who have are investigated.
3.2.1 How social identity impacts performance and confidence in one's chances to win the individual tournament
For both men and women, the Task 1 and Task 2 performances are lower among participants with a group Identity. However, the difference is significant only for the Task 2 performance of men (a two-sided Mann Whitney test yields p=0.05) who solved on average 7.4 additions during the Benchmark sessions and 5.9 during the Identity sessions. Furthermore, while men from the Benchmark sessions performed significantly (p=0.04) better under the tournament remuneration scheme (Task 2) than under the piece rate (Task 1), such is not the case in the Identity sessions in which performances are not significantly different between Task 1 and 2 neither for men (p=0.12) nor for women (p=0.51).
In addition to performance, what can also explain the decision to enter the individual tournament is the confidence in one's chances to win the tournament. In order to make it possible to compute a measure of overconfidence, participants had to answer several beliefassessment questions. In particular, they had to guess the Task 2 performance of a randomly chosen participant present in the room. Subjects taking part in the Identity sessions also had to guess the Task 2 performance of a randomly chosen member of the other group present in the room. From these answers, the dummy variable guesswin equal to 1 if the participant's beliefs are consistent with winning the tournament, and to 0 otherwise, was computed in the following way. In the Benchmark sessions, guesswin is set equal to 1 if a subject thinks the Task 2 performance of a randomly chosen participant is lower or equal to her own Task 2 performance, and to 0 otherwise. In the Identity sessions, guesswin is set equal to 1 if a subject thinks the Task 2 performance of a randomly chosen member of the other group is lower or equal to her own Task 2 performance, and to 0 otherwise. Given Tajfel believe that men are on average better than women, this could explain why they are less confident in their chances of winning when they are more likely to be competing against a man 5 . As for men, respectively 85% and 83% (p=0.81) in the Benchmark sessions and the Identity sessions hold beliefs consistent with winning the individual tournament. Table 1 reports the results of two logit regression with Guesswin as the independent variable on the following regressors: the dummy variable Id (=1 if the participant took part in one of the Identity sessions, 0 if she took part in one of the Benchmark sessions), the dummy variable Female (=1 if the participant is a woman, 0 otherwise), the interaction term Id*Female and Prob (corresponding to the probability of winning the tournament given the participant's performance and the other participants' performances). Even though participants only know their absolute performance and therefore ignore their probability of winning, it is important to include the probability of winning in the regressors in order to know whether the more able participants are more confident in their chances of winning the tournament. Here, it is clearly the case as Prob is positive and highly significant. It can be seen, from the first regression, that women and participants to the Identity sessions are less likely than, respectively, men and participants to the Benchmark sessions, to hold beliefs consistent with winning the tournament. However, when adding the interaction term Id*Female to the regressors, Id and Female are no longer significant suggesting that the lower confidence of women and participants to the Identity sessions is mainly driven by women who participated in an Identity session.
The effect of social identity on the decision to enter the individual tournament
In Task 3, participants were asked to choose between a piece rate and a tournament, knowing that they would win their tournament if they correctly solved more additions during Task 5 In order to check for this possibility, two additionnal sessions were run where the group identity relies on the gender of the participants (the male goup vs the female group). The results are reported in subsection 3.5. 3 than a randomly chosen opponent (belonging to the other group for the Identity sessions)
during Task 2. The most obvious guess would have been that group identity increases the number of participants willing to enter the individual tournament.
In the Benchmark sessions, 51% of women and 85% of men chose to enter the tournament (a two-sided Fisher's exact test yields p=0.00). In the Identity sessions, 32% of women and 75% of men (p=0.00) made such a choice. While, in both cases, men chose the tournament significantly more often than women, one can also notice that participants to the Identity sessions entered the competition less often than their counterparts from the Benchmark sessions. Looking closer at these differences in tournament entry between treatments, it appears that while men's decision to enter the tournament is not significantly different between treatments (p=0.31), women from the Identity sessions choose marginally significantly (p=0.10) less often the tournament than women from the Benchmark sessions. Again, the fact that the proportion of men is higher in the Identity sessions could help explain why fewer women enter the tournament if they think they are less likely to beat a male opponent.
Figures 1 and 2 represent, for both treatments, the proportion of men and women of each performance level (below and above the median performance) choosing the tournament. It appears that while men from the Benchmark sessions chose the tournament all the more that their performance was high (a two-sided Fisher's exact test yields p=0.01), the choice of men from the Identity sessions does not seem to depend on their performance level (p=1.00). On the contrary, when high-performing women from the Benchmark sessions do not enter the tournament more often than their low-performing counterparts (p=1.00), women from the Identity sessions seem to be acting more strategically, entering more if their performance is high (p=0.08). The regressions (1) concerning respectively the Benchmark subjects and the Identity subjects reported in table 2 confirm that, in both treatments, conditional on the probability of winning the tournamentof Female increases when Female*Prob is introduced in the regressors) by high-performing women entering the tournament more often than their less performing counterparts and at similar rates than men.
It can be seen from the first regression concerning all subjects that participants from the Identity sessions choose the tournament less often than participants from the Benchmark sessions. However, the second regression suggests that this result is driven by female participants from the Identity sessions being less competitive than their counterparts from the Benchmark sessions since the addition of the interaction term Id*Female makes the coefficent of Id become close to zero and lose significance. The third and fourth regressions confirm that high-performing women, and more precisely high-performing women from the Identity sessions are drawn to the competition. Indeed, when the interaction term Prob*Female is added in the third regression, the coefficient of Female decreases from -0.24 to -0.37, indicating that if it were not for high-performing women, women would be repelled by competition even more. Furthermore, the addition of Id*Female*Prob (p=0.10) makes the coefficient of Id*Female become more negative and more significant, suggesting that high-performing women reduce the increase of the gender gap in tournament entry happening when creating a group Identity. In consequence, low-performing women from the Identity sessions are most responsible for the worsening of the gender gap since they enter at lower rates than low-performing women from the Benchmark sessions, as can be seen from figure 2.
These first results imply that the attempt to create a group Identity has caused women, and more precisely low-performing women to shy away even more from competition. They also tend to show that the membership to a group makes men act less strategically while, surprisingly, the opposite seems to be true for women.
The regressions reported in table 3 may help us understand these first results by assessing the role of beliefs (Guesswin) and risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion (Submit) in the decision to enter the individual tournament. The dummy variable Submit is equal to 1 if the participant's Task 3 bis decision was to submit her Task 1 performance to the individual tournament, and to 0 otherwise. Task 3 and 3 bis decisions are very similar except for the fact that Task 3 bis does not involve a subsequent performance. In consequence, Task 3 bis allows one to control for everything that can explain the decision to enter the individual tournament (confidence in one's chances to win, risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion) except for the taste for competition. Since a control for confidence was already included in the regressors (Guesswin), the decision to submit a past performance to the individual tournament adds a new control for risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion.
The first noticeable fact is that, whereas beliefs and risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion help explain part of the gender gap in tournament entry in both the Benchmark and Identity sessions, the residual unexplained gender gap is almost twice as important in the Identity sessions. This suggests that the attempt to create a group Identity has increased women's fear of competition. Section 4 provides some intuitions of why this could be the case. Indeed, women are not significantly less likely to submit a past performance to the individual tournament when they took part in the Identity sessions rather than in the Benchmark sessions (a two-sided Fisher's exact test yields p=0.82) but they are significantly less likely to enter the individual tournament (p=0.10). The regressions on the whole pool of participants confirm that risk, ambiguity and feedback aversion do not help explain why women from the Identity sessions enter less than their counterparts from the Benchmark sessions (since the coefficient of Id*Female becomes even more negative when Submit is added to the regressors).
The effect of social identity on entry in the team tournament
If, as suggested by past experimental evidence (Eckel and Grossman, 2005, Brewer and Kramer, 1986) , group identity shifts individual behaviors from self-interest towards the interest of the whole group, one would expect men and especially high-performing men, not to shy away from the team tournament when competing with a fellow group member against two members of the other group. Furthermore, since women from the Benchmark sessions entered the team tournament more often (even if not significantly so) than the individual tournament, one would guess that the goup identity could increase further their willingness to compete as part of a team. Observing the results of the regressions reported in table 4, two main facts are noticeable.
Firstly, the coefficient of Team is negative and highly significant in the Benchmark treatment but it is positive and no longer significant in the Identity treatment. As can be seen on figures 3 and 4, subjects from the Identity sessions do not enter significantly less in the tournament when it is team-based while this is the case for subjects from the Benchmark sessions (at In the Benchmark sessions, one can first notice that the coefficient of Female is close to zero and not significant, proving that there is no gender gap in team tournament entry.
It can also be seen that a participant who chooses to submit her past performance to the team tournament is likely to also choose to enter the team tournament. However, since the coefficient of Idpartn is close to zero and not significant, it seems that a participant who chooses to enter the Task 5 team tournament with a teammate of the same level is no more likely than one who chooses the piece rate at Task 5 to have chosen to enter the team tournament at Task 4. This tends to show that the participants entering the team 
The gender-dependent response to group identity
In the Benchmark sessions, men choose the individual tournament more often than women but they stay out of the tournament when it is team-based while, in the same time, women do not significantly change their competitive behavior, resulting in the elimination of the gender gap in tournament entry when the competition becomes team-based. However, when a group Identity has been built, the team competition no longer induces a change in men's competitive behavior and a gender gap also exists in the team tournament. This subsection aims at understanding why men no longer react to the competition being team-based when they belong to a social group.
Figures 5 and 6 are a good illustration of how group identity changes men and women's competitive behavior. In the Benchmark sessions, men entered massively the individual tournament but many of them chose not to participate in the team competition unless they knew they would be matched with a teammate of level close to their own. It then seems that men are unwilling to take the chance of being dragged down by a less efficient temmate.
However, if group identity makes men act less in their own interest and more in the interest of their group, one could expect men to more easily accept the possibility of losing because of a less able teammate if he or she is a fellow group member. Indeed, when a group identity has been built, men enter at very similar rates in each of the three tournaments. As for women, it seems from figure 6 that the creation of a group identity has just made them less prone to enter each of the three tournaments. The change in decision to enter the team tournament provoked by the creation of a group identity seems to be largely driven by a change in the way participants react to the uncertainty on their teammate's ability. It is, however, likely that participants respond differently to this uncertainty depending on their own ability level. advantage of the performance of a more able teammate. Indeed, they are less likely to choose the team tournament when matched with a teammate of the same (low) level as their own.
As for high-performing men, almost all of them enter the individual tournament but a lot of them are repelled from the team tournament by the possibility of being dragged-down by a less able participant (since most of them are willing to enter the team tournament with a teammate of the same level). The creation of a group identity seems to have provoked a change in men's reasons for entering a tournament. In the Identity sessions, men's choice to enter a tournament does not seem to vary with their performance, and it does not seem to depend on the type of tournament (individual vs team-based) either. More precisely, men do not opt out of the tournament when it is team-based. Group membership seems to have make men willing to accept helping a less able participant get higher payoffs.
As for women, in the Benchmark sessions, there seems to be no link between their performance level and their decision to enter a tournament (see figures (c) and (d)). They just enter at slightly higher rates when the tournament is team-based rather than individual.
On the other hand, in the Identity sessions, women act a bit more strategically, choosing to enter the individual tournament all the more that their performance is high. Furthermore, low-performing women seem to be attracted by the team tournament whether they have information about their teammate's level or not while high-performing women choose the tournament slightly less often when it is team-based except if they know their teammate will be of the same (high) level as their own.
Since the effect of group identity seems to be different for low-performing and highperforming participants, seperate regressions were run for both. Table 6 reports the results of regressions of low-performing men and women's decision to enter a tournament. Group identity seems to have a negative impact on low-performing men's decision to enter the team tournament. However the coefficient of Id*Team is far from being significant but it almost reaches significance (p=0.11) and becomes even more negative when the decision to enter the team tournament with a teammate of the same level, Idpartn, is added to the regressors. This tends to show that, the reason why group identity makes low-performing men less willing to enter the tournament when it is team-based lies in the uncertainty surrounding their teammate's ability. Indeed, group identity makes lowperforming men more willing to enter the team tournament when they know they will be matched with a teammate of the same (low) level as their own but they do not want to take the chance of dragging down a possibly high-performing fellow group member, or, at least, less than their counterparts from the Benchmark sessions, as illustrated by part (a) of figure 7.
As for low-performing women, the opposite is true. The coefficient of Id*Team is positive but it only reaches significance (p=0.10) after Idpartn id added to the regressors meaning that, controlling for the decision to enter the team tournament with a teammate of the same level, the creation of a group identity makes low-performing women more likely to enter the regular team tournament. This suggests that low-performing women from the Identity sessions are more driven towards the team tournament by the hope of being matched with a higher performing teammate than low-performing women from the Benchmark sessions.
To be more precise and in line with part (c) of figure 7, group identity seems to make low-performing women less afraid of dragging down a probably more efficient teammate.
Indeed, while low-performing women from the Benchmark sessions enter more often the team tournament when they know their teammate will be of same (low) level as their own, their counterparts from the Identity sessions enter the team tournament and the team tournament with a teammate of the same level at very similar rates. Let us also notice that the coefficient of Id is always negative and significant showing that group identity makes low-performing women less willing to compete. Idpartn is added to the regressors, the coefficient of Id*Team increases and remains significant highlighting the role of the uncertainty on one's teammate's ability. Being part of a social group makes men more willing to take the chance of being matched with a less able teammate. In consequence, group identity causes men to enter the team competition almost as often as the individual tournament while it was far from being the case in the Benchmark sessions.
Concerning high-performing women, the coefficient of Id*Team is negative but not significant. One can also see that, since the coefficient of Id is not significant, group identity does not make high-performing women less willing to compete whether it is the case for low-performing women.
How male vs female competition affects men and women's competitive behavior
The results reported until now concern subjects who went through artificial group-identitybuilding activities. Two additional sessions were run using a naturally-occuring identity:
male vs female. 8 This section investigates whether knowing that one will have to compete against members of the opposite gender with someone of the same gender as teammate in 8 For these two sessions, the experimental design was the same as that of the Benchmark sessions except that participants knew that if they engaged in a tournament their opponent(s) would be of the opposite gender and their teammate, in the case of team competition, would be of the same gender as their own. Thus, participants did not take part in group-identity-building activities as they did in the Identity sessions. the case of the team tournament has an impact on men and women's competitive behavior.
Notice, however, that the scarce data available (only 20 men and 20 women took part in these gender-identity sessions) do not allow to draw definite conclusions.
Can the higher proportion of men in the Identity sessions account for the decrease in women's competitiveness?
Since the Benchmark sessions were composed of 51% of men while there were 58% of men in the Identity sessions and this could have had an impact on men and women's competitiveness, it allows to check whether, knowing one is going to have to compete against a member of the opposite gender with someone of the same gender as teammate for the team tournament, has an impact on one's decision to compete. 40 participants took part in these gender-identity sessions, 20 men and 20 women.
The first result that can be drawn from these two sessions concerns the participants' confidence in their chances to win the individual tournament. If the reason why women are less confident in their chances of winning the individual tournament in the Identity sessions than in the Benchmark sessions is because they are more likely to be opposed to a man in the Identity sessions, one would expect women to be even less confident when they know for sure their opponent will be a man. Actually, women are as confident in their chances to beat their opponent when they know it is a man than when they do not know and have a fifty-fifty chance of being opposed to either a men or a women (respectively 75% and 78%
of women in the gender-identity sessions and the Benchmark sessions hold beliefs consistent with winning the individual tournament) and they are more confident than women from the Identity sessions (of which 58% hold such beliefs) who have a 58% chance of being opposed to a man, even though, not significantly so (a two-sided exact Fisher's test yields p=0.21).
This would tend to invalidate the assumption that women from the Identity sessions are less confident because they are more likely to have a male opponent and they believe men to be on average better than women.
Studying women's decision to enter the individual tournament, one can also rule out the higher probability of having a male opponent as a reason for women to enter less often in the tournament in the Identity sessions than in the Benchmark sessions. Indeed, if such was the case, women's propensity to enter the individual tournament would drop sharply in the gender-identity sessions where they know for sure their opponent will be a man, which does not happen. Women from the gender-identity sessions enter the individual tournament at a slightly higher rate than women in the Identity sessions (40% vs 32%) and a little bit more often than their counterparts from the Benchmark sessions of which 51% prefer the individual tournament to the piece rate. Neither of these differences reaches significance.
It therefore seems that the gender of her opponent is not a main driver of women's decision whether to enter the individual tournament. The reason for which women shy away from competition even more when they are part of a social group must then be, either that the identity-building-activities failed at instilling them a sense of group membership, or that belonging to a group does not make women more willing to compete against outgroups but, if anything, makes them more peaceable towards others.
Men and women's willingness to compete as a team in a male vs female competition
Studying the pattern of tournament-entry decisions in the gender-identity sessions, it seems that men exhibit the same competitive behavior as in the Benchmark sessions, entering massively in the individual tournament (74%) but a lot of them dropping out of the team tournament (42%) unless they know they will be matched with a teammate of level close to their own (79%). Looking closer at this behavior, it appears that high-performing men (with an above-median Task 2 performance) are the more prone to opt out of the team tournament when they ignore the ability of their teammate. It therefore appears that men do not display the same solidarity towards other unknown men than they do towards fellow group members of unknown gender. Namely, they are willing to lower their chances of winning the tournament when matched with a member of their social group but are reluctant to do so with a male teammate they share nothing else with. Furthermore, men react in the same way whether they ignore the gender of their opponents (as it is the case in the Benchmark sessions) or they know they are female.
As for women, their decision to compete does not depend much on the modality of the competition (respectively 40%, 35% and 40% of women enter the individual tournament, team tournament and team tournament with a teammate of the same level). Studying separately low-performing and high-performing women, it seems that, while low-performing women enter the team tournament a bit more when they do not know the ability of their teammate than when they know they will be matched with a women of the same (low) level as their own, lots of high-performing women enter the team tournament only when they know their teammate will be of (high) ability like themselves. As this was not the case in the Benchmark sessions, it could mean that women are less prone to solidarity towards another woman than towards a random teammate.
The creation of a group identity has led to changes in both men and women's competitive behavior.
High-performing men become more prone to help a possibly less efficient teammate get higher payoffs if he or she is a fellow group member, while low-performing men are less likely to take advantage of a probably more efficient teammate when they belong to the same social group. This is in line with the idea that group identity shifts behaviors from individual interest towards the interest of the group. Eckel and Grossman (2005) found that a strong induced identity succeeds in reducing individual shirking behaviors and free-riding in public goods games. Wit and Wilke (1992) 's results suggest that group categorization elicits more cooperation than individual categorization. The perception of sharing a common fate leads to more self-restraint in a common-ressource dilemma (Brewer and Kramer, 1986) .
Furthermore, Tajfel and Turner (1986) showed that individuals who perceive themselves as members of a social group want to maximize the inter-group outcome difference which may explain why men become more willing to enter a team competition against an outgroup team.
Women's reaction to the creation of a social identity is more surprising. The first noticeable fact is that the group identity seems to have decreased low-performing women's willingness to enter competitive environments. Another change in women's behavior caused by the creation of a group identity is that low-performing women tend to less hesitate to take advantage of a more efficient teammate when they belong to her group. It thus seems that women do not experience the same shift in their behavior towards acting more in the interest of their group as men do. One can only venture some reasons why this is the case. Firstly, it may be the case that the attempt of creating a group identity did not succeed for women as well as it did for men. As a result, women may not perceive themselves as belonging to their group or they may not feel as included as men do. Some past experimental findings back up this interpretation of women's behavior. Cadsby and Maynes (1998) found that their attempt to create a group identity decreased women's contributions in early rounds of the public good game. They blame it on the fact that the activity meant to build a group identity failed to do so for women as they did not seem to have enjoyed it. In the same vein, Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) found an effect of the creation of a group identity for men who contribute more to the public good when belonging to a group, but none for women. Secondly, women may perceive themselves as members of their group but not react to this group identity in the same way as men do. For instance, while low-performing men feel less entitled to take advantage of a probably more able participant if he is a fellow group member rather than a total stranger, women may, on the contrary, be more comfortable dragging down a member of their social group than a random participant. However, if this second interpretation held, high-performing women should be more willing to be matched with a probably less efficient teammate if he or she belongs to her group rather than if he or she is a total stranger, which is not the case.
Conclusion
Recent experimental research papers are interested in how social identity affects individual behavior. Most existing results focus on self-other allocation games (Chen and Li, 2009) , social dilemmas or public-goods games (Charness et al., 2007 , Sutter, 2009 , Eckel and Grossman, 2005 . The present paper studies the effect of an artificially created group identity on participants' willingness to compete either alone or as part of a team. Participants were randomly separated into two groups and could use a instant message system to communicate with their fellow group members. Using this communication system, they had to find a name for their group and then to answer a four-question quizz which was meant to build a sense of group membership.
The main result is that, while team competition was successful in eliminating the gender gap in tournament entry in the Benchmark sessions, it is no longer the case in the Identity sessions. The reason lies in men's behavior and, more precisely, in high-performing men's behavior who opt out of team competition in the Benchmark sessions because they dread being matched with a less able teammate but overcome this fear when their teammate is a fellow group member.
This result suggests that high-performing men are more comfortable working in teams with teammates they perceive as belonging to the same circles as they do. Indeed, Montgomery (1991) finds that 50 percent of workers employed at the time of their study got their job through friends or relatives. This could also help explain why alumni from a given university often try to hire graduates from the same university. According to Rebick (2000) , more than half of all hires on the japanese job market can be attributed to employers' persistence to hire graduates from the same universities.
Another finding of this paper is that low-performing women become less willing to compete and, if anything, less socially-oriented when one tried to instill them a sense of group membership. As for high-performing women, they do not display any sign of "group spirit"
either. Whether this is because the group identity building activities failed to make women feel included in their group or because women are not as prone as men to cliquish behaviors remains unclear.
Future research may study how the nature of social groups affects one's willingness to compete as part of a team as Solow and Kirkwood (2002) show that contributions to public goods are sensible to this issue. It could also be interesting to find out how knowing the gender of one's other group members influences competitive behaviors.
Instructions
Benchmark sessions
The experiment is composed of 8 tasks. Before each task, you will be carefully explained what the task is about and have the opportunity to ask as many questions as you need.
Please remember that you are not allowed to communicate in any way with one another. At the end of the experiment two of the eight tasks you will have completed will be randomly chosen to determine your payoffs. If you choose the Piece Rate, you will receive 50 cents per addition correctly solved during Task 3.
If you select the tournament, you will receive 1 euro per correct answer if your Task 3 performance exceeds the Task 2 performance of a randomly chosen opponent, otherwise you will receive nothing. You will earn 50 cents per addition correctly solved during Task 3 in case of a tie.
At the end of Task 3, a screen will indicate how many additions you solved correctly but you will know whether you won your tournament, if you choose to engage in it, only at the end of the experiment.
NEXT PAGE
Task 3 bis. Choice between submitting Task 1 performance to Piece Rate or Individual Tournament: No additions to do here, the performance which will determine your payoffs is your Task 1 performance.
If you choose to submit your Task 1 performance to the Piece Rate, you will receive 50 cents times your Task 1 performance.
If you choose to submit your Task 1 performance to the individual tournament, you will receive 1 euro per addition correctly solved in Task 1 if you solved more additions in Task 1 than your randomly chosen opponent, otherwise you will receive nothing. You will earn 50 cents per addition correctly solved during Task 1 in case of a tie.
You will know whether you won your tournament, if you choose to submit your Task 1 performance to the tournament, only at the end of the experiment.
NEXT PAGE If you choose to submit your task 1 performance to the Piece Rate, you will receive 50 cents times your Task 1 performance.
If you choose to submit your task 1 performance to the team tournament with a teammate of the same level, two opponents will be randomly drawn from among the other participants present in the room. Your teammate will be the participant, who chose to submit to the team tournament with a teammate of the same level, whose Task 2 performance was the closest to your own Task 2 performance. If the number of additions solved by your team during Task 1 exceeds the number of additions solved by the opposing team during Task 1, you and your teammate will each receive 1 euro times the average score of their team.
Otherwise, you and your teammate will receive nothing. You and your teammate will each earn 50 cents times the average score of the team during Task 1 in case of a tie.
Belief-assessment Questions
The experiment is now almost over. You just have to answer a few questions about the experiment. For each correct guess, you will earn 1 additional euro.
At Task 4, whether you chose to enter the team tournament or not, two opponents were randomly drawn among the other participants present in the room. One teammate was randomly drawn among the participants who chose the Team Tournament. Knowing that your own Task 2 performance will be recalled to you on the next screen, please guess the task 2 performances of your 2 opponents and your teammate. Also guess the Task 2 performance of the average participant present in the room.
Identity sessions
You have been randomly split into two groups of equal size by the computer. Nevertheless, you cannot know who in this room belongs and does not belong to your group and it is important that it remains this way. There will be three phases to this experiment. I will explain clearly what each phase is about before it begins and you will have the opportunity to ask as many clarifying questions as you need.
First phase
In this first phase, all you have to do is find a name for your group. In order to do so, you will be able to use an instant message system to communicate whithin your group. Of course, you will be unable to communicate with members of the other group. You will have 2 minutes to discuss what name you want to give to your group. Remember that it is important that you do not find out who is and is not in your group, so please try not to provide information on yourself that could give you away. At the end of the three minutes, the message system's window will close and a new screen will appear with a space for you to enter the name you chose. If all members in your group failed to agree on a name, I will pick the name chosen by a majority of members. I will then publicly announce the name chosen by both groups.
Second phase
In the second phase, you have to answer a four-question quizz with your group. For each question, you have two minutes to discuss through the instant message system what you think is the good answer among the four possibilities. At the end of the two minutes, you have to click on the possibility which you think is the right answer. The answer validated for your whole group is the one chosen by a majority of members. You will earn 1 euro per correct answer validated for your group. Please note that if say, the correct answer is answer A and you selected answer A but all your fellow group members chose answer B, you will earn nothing for this question since the answer validated for you and your all group is (incorrect) answer B. You will know the correct answers and how much you made during this second phase only at the end of the experiment.
Third phase
The third phase is composed of 8 tasks. Before each task, you will be carefully explained what the task is about and have the opportunity to ask as many questions as you need.
Please remember that you are not allowed to communicate in any way with one another. At the end of the experiment two of the eight tasks you will have completed will be randomly chosen to determine your payoffs. If you select the tournament, you will receive 1 euro per correct answer if your Task 3 performance exceeds the Task 2 performance of an opponent randomly chosen among the members of the other group, otherwise you will receive nothing. You will earn 50 cents per addition correctly solved during Task 3 in case of a tie.
At the end of Task 3, a screen will indicate how many additions you solved correctly but you will know whether you won your tournament, if you choose to engage in it, only at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will find out how many members of your group and of the other group chose the tournament and how many won it.
NEXT PAGE
If you choose to submit your Task 1 performance to the individual tournament, you will receive 1 euro per addition correctly solved in Task 1 if you solved more additions in Task 1 than your opponent randomly chosen among the members of the other group, otherwise you will receive nothing. You will earn 50 cents per addition correctly solved during Task 1 in case of a tie.
You will know whether you won your tournament, if you choose to submit your Task 1 performance to the tournament, only at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will find out how many members of your group and of the other group chose the tournament and how many won it.
NEXT PAGE Task Otherwise, you will receive nothing. You and your teammate will each earn 50 cents times the average score of the team during Task 4 in case of a tie.
At the end of Task 4, a screen will indicate how many additions you solved correctly but you will know whether you won your tournament, if you choose to engage in it, only at the end of the experiment. You will not know either your teammate's performance until the end of the experiment.
If you choose the tournamentn, you will only know whether you won it at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will find out how many members of your group and of the other group chose the tournament and how many won it. If you choose the tournamentn, you will only know whether you won it at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will find out how many members of your group and of the other group chose the tournament and how many won it.
NEXT PAGE At the end of Task 5, a screen will indicate how many additions you solved correctly but you will know whether you won your tournament, if you choose to engage in it, only at the end of the experiment. You will not know either your teammate's performance until the end of the experiment.
If you choose the tournamentn, you will only know whether you won it at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will find out how many members of your group and of the other group chose the tournament and how many won it.
Task 5 bis. Choice between submitting Task 1 performance to Piece Rate or
Team Tournament with a teammate of the same level: No additions to do here, the performance which will determine your payoff is your Task 1 performance.
If you choose to submit your task 1 performance to the Piece Rate, you will receive 50 cents times your Task 1 performance.
If you choose to submit your task 1 performance to the team tournament with a teammate of the same level, two opponents will be randomly drawn from among the members of the other group. Your teammate will be the member of your group, who chose to submit to the team tournament with a teammate of the same level, whose Task 2 performance was the closest to your own Task 2 performance. If the number of additions solved by your team during Task 1 exceeds the number of additions solved by the opposing team during Task 1, you and your teammate will each receive 1 euro times the average score of their team.
a few questions about the experiment. For each correct guess, you will earn 1 additional euro.
At Task 4, whether you chose to enter the team tournament or not, two members of the other group were randomly drawn among the other participants present in the room. One teammate was randomly drawn among the members of your own group who chose the Team Tournament. Knowing that your own Task 2 performance will be recalled to you on the next screen, please guess the task 2 performances of your 2 opponents and your teammate.
Also guess the Task 2 performance of a randomly chosen member of your group and of a randomly chosen member of the other group.
